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ABSTRCT 
The financial crisis of 2008 brought many changes to the world economy with China 
seeming to stand out as one of the countries best able to weather the storm. There is a 
general belief that this is because China has a strong state which has reshaped the role of 
China in the new international division of labour and has the ability to resume its 
economic development internally. Our study of labour policy and workers’ struggles 
tells a different story. We argue that the state-driven process of economic globalization 
has created a new million-strong working class in China. A paradoxical phenomenon is 
that this state-driven process in economic globalization has been accompanied by a state 
retreat process in the areas of social reproduction and social protection. This state 
withdrawal process largely shapes a specific pattern of proletarianization of Chinese 
labour and a specific capital-labour relationship which contribute to recent, and 
intensifying, migrant workers’ struggles in China. 
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1. Introduction 
 The financial crisis of 2008 brought the world economy into a new stage. While the 
western capitalist countries seriously suffered, China seems to stand out as one of the 
few countries which could resist the economic tsunami. There is a general belief that 
this ability arises from China’s strong state which has reshaped the role of China in the 
new international division of labour and which also has the ability to resume its 
economic development internally. Our study of labour policy and workers’ struggles 
challenges this belief. 
  China has deeply transformed itself into ‘a factory of the world.’ We argue that 
this transformation is state initiated and has been achieved with the collusion of the 
interests of transnational capital in its search for off-shore production relocation. In the 
early 1990s, a new phase of economic reform began when the dual-track plan and 
market system was phased out (Naughton 1999). In 1992, Deng Xiaoping staged the 
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‘Southern Tour’ to the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone and Guangdong province, 
stimulating a new wave of foreign investment. The Chinese state made huge efforts to 
bring the country into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in November 
2001—henceforth driving further for economic globalization in the 21st century. China 
surpassed the US as the largest recipient of the world foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
2002 (China’s Ministry of Commerce, 16 January 2003). In 2005, overseas funded 
enterprises in China accounted for 57.3 percent of China’s overall exports and they took 
a huge share of 87.9 percent of high-tech exports (China’s Ministry of Commerce, 12 
June 2006). Even when China’s absorption of FDI down 26.2 percent over that of 2007, 
newly approved foreign funded companies in the country totaled 22,736 between 
January and October 2008 (China’s Ministry of Commerce, 17 November 2008).  
 This state-driven process of globalization has created a new millions-strong 
working class in China. A paradox is that this state-driven process of economic 
globalization has been accompanied by a state withdrawal process in the areas of social 
reproduction and social protection. The socialist legacy of contracting agricultural lands 
to individual rural households is one of the enabling factors for China in creating a 
pro-business environment: employers do not need to pay their peasant-workers a living 
wage or the full cost of social reproduction of labour, which are supposed to be 
subsidized by the workers’ rural communities. Local host governments likewise have 
shunned the responsibility for improving the livelihoods of internal migrant workers and 
their families under their jurisdiction. This state withdrawal process shapes a specific 
pattern of proletarianization of Chinese labour and a specific capital-labour relationship 
which contributes to a growing number of migrant workers’ struggles in China.  
 Persistent struggles by Chinese workers themselves have created huge pressure on 
the post-Mao state to redefine its position towards labour conflicts. From 2003 onwards, 
the new Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao leadership has emphasized harmony and stability in 
society, even over the pursuit of economic growth and efficiency. The labour rule of law
—regulating labour contracts, wages, work hours, social insurance, compensations, and 
official trade union membership—has vastly been expanded. The goal is to demobilize 
worker discontent through the institutionalized legal and bureaucratic systems.  
 Labour protests, however, will likely increase in frequency as the market reforms 
deepen and generate new forms of social as well as class inequalities in China. State 
power and capital have become more closely associated than ever, giving rise to class 
polarization and income inequality. By the early 2000s, measured by the Gini 
coefficient1, China (0.447) was more unequal than other Asian countries such as 
Indonesia (0.343), India (0.325) and Bangladesh (0.318) (World Bank data, quoted in 
Khan and Riskin 2005). In 2006, the figure jumped to 0.496, surpassing the level of 
inequality in the US (quoted in Andreas 2008). If we take into account sources of 
wealth other than income, the economic and social disparities between rural and urban 
areas as well as between regions in China are even larger. Demanding economic justice 
and social rights, Chinese workers have pushed for changes from the bottom-up. Their 
abilities to improve the working and living conditions will be significant for both local 
class struggles and global labour politics.  
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In the next section we document the ways in which the state has been instrumental 
in transforming China into a world factory. In section three, we show how the dynamics 
of this process have created a new migrant working class. Included here is an analysis of 
how the state’s withdrawal from the provision of social protection has been central to 
this. Despite efforts by the new leadership since 2003 to address issues of social 
protection, for the great majority of migrant workers these efforts remain at the level of 
rhetoric and not substance. In section four, we discuss how labour protests have been 
escalating and analyze one particular strike in Shenzhen in 2007 to illustrate how class 
consciousness is developing among the new migrant working class. The rising labour 
struggles have led the central authorities to change labour laws and to channel labour 
disputes through bureaucratic legal structures. This is discussed in section five where 
we argue that these legal measures fall far short of providing the necessary protection 
for workers. We conclude, in section six, that worker struggles are likely to intensify as 
a result of the current global economic crisis.    
 
 
2. State-Driven Transformation: China as a ‘World Factory’ in Globalization  
Capitalist encroachment on the family labour sector and the relentless displacement 
of small enterprises by larger ones is fundamentally market-driven, but it is also state 
policy. China’s political leaders do not want backward produce markets, they want 
modern supermarkets, and state officials are expected to identify and support ‘winners’ 
in the economic competition (Andreas 2008: 140). 
 Western commentators, from the political left to the right, typically admire China’s 
economic achievement symbolized by the iconic skylines of Beijing and Shanghai as 
well as by the stunning economic figures frequently reported by the media. Among 
others, in 2002, China became the top world producer of eighty products, including 
garments, TVs, washing machines, refrigerators, air-conditioners, microwave ovens, 
DVD players, cameras, PC monitors, tractors, bicycles, and motorcycles. In 2005 China 
became the world’s third largest trading country, surpassed only by the US and 
Germany. In 2006, China climbed to fourth place in the world in terms of the size of the 
economy. Alongside the dramatic economic growth, the manufacturing structure also 
moved into high-end goods. Advanced technology exports are second only to the US, 
and China overtook Japan to become the world’s second largest investor in research and 
development in 2007. 
 The rise of China as a major economic power, however, is not a natural 
consequence of the free market in the age of globalization as neoliberal economists 
assume. Thirty years of socialism left a powerful state-authority to drive the process of 
‘reform and open’ policies forwards.  
After more than ten years of negotiation, China ‘won’ its WTO membership on 11 
December 2001. It has had a very significant impact on China’s export and investment 
activities. Taking the garment and textile industry as an example, government has 
actively shaped reshaped the transformation of the industry. On 1 January 2005, the
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Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA) which had limited China’s exports of garments was 
completely phased out among WTO members. By 2004 China had already emerged as 
the biggest garment exporter with 26.6 percent of the world’s total exports; taking Hong 
Kong into account, the proportion was as high as 38 percent. In the same year, the 
textile and clothing industries in China employed 19 million workers or 18.9 percent of 
the total employment in the manufacturing sector (Chan 2005, Au 2005). Economists 
have identified China and India as the two main beneficiaries from the phasing out of 
MFA.  
 China is also the world’s largest producer of electronic products. Its exports 
increased by 27 percent to US$230 billion in 2005, following growth rates of 44 percent 
and 53 percent in 2004 and 2003, respectively (Reed Electronics Research 2006). By 
product segment, in 2007, a total of 150 million square meters of printed circuit boards 
(PCBs) were produced in the country, making up nearly 30 percent of the world’s total. 
The production value of PCB of Chinese origin hit US$15.5 billion in 2007 (Research 
and Markets 2008). The transformation in electronics has been characterized by rapid 
upgrading from low-cost consumer goods to higher-technology items. Today, 
information technology is predominant, such as the manufacturing of PCs, cell phones, 
MP3, and game consoles. 
 Zooming inside China’s global factory, labour costs are as low as one sixth that of 
Mexico and one fortieth that of the US (Lee 2004). Chinese municipal governments in 
the Pearl River Delta regions in southern China increased the statutory minimum wages 
by as little as 68 yuan (approximately US$10) over a 12-year period between the 1990s 
and early 2000s (China’s Ministry of Labour and Social Security 2004). The state has 
strategically produced an inexpensive Chinese workforce absorbed from the countryside 
since the 1980s and at the same time, absolved itself of the responsibility of providing 
this new workforce with minimal protections and rights. This process is discussed in 
more detail in the next section.    
  
3. The Making of !ew Generations of a Chinese Migrant Working Class  
 The rapid development of export processing and technology experimental zones 
across China, similar to the development of corresponding establishments in most other 
developing economies, was based on a massive harnessing of young peasant-workers, in 
particular of women, who are often the cheapest and most compliant labour (Lee 1998, 
Pun 2005, Gaetano and Jacka 2004). Officials have partially relaxed the decades-old 
household registration system and actively coordinated the transfer of rural ‘surplus 
labour’ to the booming cities. By the mid-1990s, rural surveys estimated that the 
number of internal migrant labourers ranged from 50 to 70 million nationwide (Roberts, 
Connelly, Xie, and Zheng 2004: 49). Some sources attest that the size of the migrant 
working population is now over 130 million (China’s State Council 2006: 4).2  
 The formation of this new working class of internal rural migrant labourers or the 
dagong class is taking shape. Young peasant-workers are dagongmei/zai (female and 
male migrant workers) who embrace new gendered identities. Dagong means ‘working 
for the boss’ or ‘selling labour’, connoting commodification and a capitalist exchange of 
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labour for wages. Labour is sold to capitalists and, this time, under the auspices of state. 
In contrast to the term gongren or urban worker, which carried the highest status in the 
socialist rhetoric of Mao Zedong’s day, the new term dagong signifies a lesser identity 
as a hired hand in the market (Lee 1998, Pun 1999, 2005). 
 Peasant-workers are not new in China. They were well represented in big cities 
such as Tianjin and Shanghai in pre-1949 China (Hershatter 1996, Honig 1996, Perry 
1993) and they were employed as temporary labourers in state-owned and collective 
enterprises in the socialist period (Walder 1984). However, the new generations of 
peasant-workers are radically different from previous ones. We observe new life 
expectations and dispositions and more collective labour action among those who have 
grown up in the reform period and entered the labour market in the late 1990s to early 
2000s (Pun and Lu, forthcoming). The characteristic of the new generations include 
greater individualism, attraction to urban consumer culture (Davis 2000, Pun 2003) 
driven more by the personal pursuit of development and freedom (Jacka 2005), higher 
job turnover rates and less loyalty to their work, but simultaneously more likely to be 
involved in spontaneous collective action at the workplace (Lee 2007, Chan 2006a, 
2006b, Chan and Pun 2009).  
 
 
THE PROCESS OF UNFINISHED PROLETARIANIZATION OF CHINESE MIGRANT LABOUR 
The process of proletarianization in post-Mao China—turning rural bodies into 
industrial waged labour—is specific to the way in which the state has promoted massive 
rural-to-urban labour migration over the past three decades. The first level of analysis is 
structural: owing to the deep rural-urban divide, highly shaped by national development 
strategies, rural authorities have submitted to the central government’s direction by 
exploring inter-provincial labour cooperation and coordination program initiatives, 
facilitating rapid urban economic growth. From the 1990s onwards Hunan and Guangxi 
provinces, for example, have systematically exported their peasant labourers to 
Guangdong in the south. In exchange, these provinces benefit from the remittances sent 
back by rural migrant workers. This migration policy also assures a continuous 
replenishment of internal migrant labourers to the production powerbases in the coastal 
cities. Strong state initiatives support the labour needs of emerging industries and 
facilitate labour supply flow to the manufacturing sites (Solinger 1999). The 
government’s labour management offices serve as the agency coordinating this market: 
first by screening and recruiting young female applicants and then transferring the 
applicants directly to the factories in the booming regions. These labour offices 
sometimes go into details such as arranging long distance coaches to transport rural 
women to work, in return for management fees from the hiring company.  
 The second level of analysis is from an individual and familial viewpoint. Young 
rural men and women alike must contend with low prices for agricultural products in 
the post-WTO accession era, limited educational opportunities, and limited village 
employment opportunities—indeed, these last two challenges are particularly 
intolerable for younger generations growing up in the reform period. Rural youth have 
no choice but to go to work at 16 or 17 years old. Some rural women also aspire to 
escape arranged marriages, familial conflicts, and patriarchal oppression. Still others 
want to widen their horizons and to experience modern life and cosmopolitan 
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consumption styles in the cities. Thus, personal decisions in out-migration—shaped by 
the state-led pro-city development strategy—support the goal of the state in channeling 
labour from rural areas to coastal industrial areas.  
 The official categorization of peasant-workers—wage labourers of rural household 
registration—means that their social status and class identities are ambiguous. The 
post-socialist Chinese state has permitted them to go out to work but not to grant them 
the right to urban permanent residence. Maintenance of the distinction between 
permanent and temporary residents through the household registration system enables 
the state, at all levels, to escape from their obligations to provide housing, job security, 
and welfare to rural migrant workers. As a result, they live mostly either in 
factory-provided collective dormitories or in substandard migrant villages within the 
city.  
 
 
THE RETREAT OF THE STATE FROM THE COSTS OF SOCIAL REPRODUCTION OF MIGRANT 
WORKERS   
We have argued that the household registration system, combined with the interests 
of domestic and foreign capital, have created exploitative mechanisms of labour 
appropriation in post-socialist China. This is the ‘state-out’ process of societal 
globalization: China’s economy needs the labour of the rural population but does not 
need the city-based survival of that population once market demand for rural-to-urban 
migrants’ labour power shifts in either location or industry. This newly forming 
working class is permitted to form no permanent roots and legal identity in the city. The 
ambiguous identity of rural migrant labour simultaneously deepens and obscures the 
exploitation of this huge population. Hence, this subtle and multi-faceted 
marginalization of rural labourers has created a contested, if not a deformed, citizenship 
that has greatly disadvantaged Chinese migrant workers who attempt to transform 
themselves into urban workers.  
Being extraordinarily dislocated in the cities, migrant labour is distinguished by its 
transient nature. A worker, especially a female worker, will usually spend a number of 
years working as a wage labourer in an industrial city before getting married. Upon 
marriage age, most of the women have to return to their rural homes because of their 
difficulty in finding partners in the city. Rural communities have long exercised—and 
have long been expected to exercise—the extended planning of life activities such as 
marriage, procreation, and family. The reproduction of labour of the next generation is 
hence left to the rural villages which bear the cost of industrial development in urban 
areas, even though the ability of the rural communities to meet reproduction costs is 
often highly constrained. Furthermore, physical or mental rehabilitation in cases of 
serious industrial injuries and occupational diseases are also presumed to be taken care 
of in the rural areas. 
Under the new leadership of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, since 2003 there have been 
pressing demands for the Chinese state to introduce more extensive social policies. 
However, most of the social policies subsequently introduced—such as employment 
policies, health policies and education policies—were either designed for the urban or 
the rural populations and hence excluded the migrant population. One notable policy  
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regarding migrant workers is the compulsory social insurance scheme comprising of 
five times: old-age pension, unemployment pension, injury compensation, medical care, 
and maternal leave. This insurance system, and the benefits arising from it, is only 
available to workers with written labour contracts. However, the percentage of migrant 
workers who have written labour contracts remains low. According to survey findings 
provided by the State Council (2006), 46.3 percent of all migrant workers were still not 
protected with a labour contract, and 51.4 percent of them were not paid on time. In the 
construction sector, the percentage of workers who had signed a labour contract was 
much lower than in the manufacturing and service sectors; in our current studies in 
Beijing, over 90 percent of the construction workers were not provided with a labour 
contract. Many of them have suffered from industrial accidents and injuries but were 
left with no compensation (Pun and Lu 2009). In the area of social protection and social 
policies, the majority of migrant workers remain unprotected; the new policies exist 
much more in form than in substance for migrant workers. Furthermore, the 
‘humanistic’ social policies launched by the central government have been largely 
ignored by the local governments whose priority is still pro-capital development. The 
floating nature of the migrant population also created excuses for the local state to 
escape its responsibility, and the local state, in return, blamed the migrant labourers for 
lacking the incentive to participate in the social insurance scheme. These current social 
reforms only pay lip service to the needs of migrant workers due to the nature of the 
existing state which serves the interests of capital, not society. 
This results in a process of the unfinished proletarianization of Chinese labour, 
driven by the state but at the same time crippled by it. It is not surprising that this has 
produced a rising tide of labour protests as we discuss in the next section.         
 
 
4. Labour Disputes and Protests in China since the 1990s  
 Resisting multi-fronted injustice and exploitations, Chinese workers have 
increasingly fought for their rights. Official statistics from various departments attest to 
the pervasiveness and intensification of labour unrest since the early 1990s throughout 
the country. There are two major types of labour conflicts: labour strikes and labour 
disputes via legal systems. In this section, we will discuss trends in both form of conflict 
drawing on official statistics and our own case study work on strikes.  
 According to China’s Ministry of Public Security, the number of mass incidents 
and demonstrations, such as collective suicide attempts, traffic blockage, and other 
public forms of civil disobedience taken by desperate workers, increased ten fold from 
8,700 in 1993 (quoted in Pei 2003) to 87,000 in 2005 (ew York Times, 20 January 
2006). Unofficially, at least one strike involving more than 1,000 workers occurs every 
day in the manufacturing hub of the Pearl River Delta region in Guangdong, to say 
nothing of the many smaller spontaneous strikes (AFP, 15 January 2008).   
 We provide an analysis of one such strike here to provide an example of the 
emerging forms of migrant working class resistance. Our study is based on our 
longitudinal fieldwork in the industrial town of Shenzhen between 2003 and 2007. 
During the period, we conducted intensive research into migrant workers’ working life 
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and social life in the town by participant observation, interviews and documentary 
research in dormitories, migrant communities and workers’ centers. The strike we 
discuss here occurred in a German electronics company in one of the industrial towns in 
Shenzhen in 2007. This strike encouraged a series of strikes in other factories leading to 
wage increases across the town.   
 
 
GERMAN FACTORY STRIKE IN 20073 
 Factory X is a German funded enterprise which produces batteries, power cords and 
other components for mobile phones. Since setting up in 1993, it has expanded into two 
large plants at two industrial towns in Shenzhen. It employed about 8,000 workers, of 
which 80 percent were women aged between 18 and 30. The wage level in factory X 
was comparatively high in the town. The minimum hourly wage rate was basically 
observed and social insurance was provided for all of the workers. The factory operated 
two shifts. The day shift is from 7:00am to 6:30pm with a one-hour lunch break, while 
the night shift is from 7:30pm to 6:45am with a 45-minute mid-night break. Ordinary 
workers usually work six days per week and their monthly salary is from 1,000 to 1,400 
yuan (approximately US$150-200). 
 In this factory, production workers are called yuan gong, employees, while others, 
including managers, supervisors, engineers, technicians, office clerks, are collectively 
called zhi yuan, staff. Most of the yuan gong live in the factory-provided dormitories 
where 8 or 12 persons share a room. Thirty yuan is deducted from wages as rent. The 
factory pays an accommodation subsidy from 200 to 300 yuan per month to zhi yuan to 
rent private rooms outside of the factory.    
 In July 2005, when the minimum wage rate in Shenzhen (outside the SEZ) was 
raised to 580 yuan, the factory adjusted the salary accordingly. The minimum wage was 
further increased to 700 yuan in 2006. Workers in factory X also got a pay rise 
accordingly. After two years of consecutive pay rises, however, the factory steadily 
began to increase the work quotas of the production line and units. If workers could not 
finish the quota unilaterally set by the management for the 11 daily working hours, they 
are ‘requested’ to perform extra work the next day without payment. The practice 
created conflict between experienced, and hence more efficient, workers and the 
inexperienced, as well as between the front line supervisors, who announced the new 
quota and forced their subordinates, and the production workers, to work faster. 
Therefore, ‘too exhausted’ rather than ‘low pay’ was the most common cause of 
discontent in the factory. Many workers quit the factory after a few months or a year, 
but most of them were not permitted to do so and there was always a long queue of 
those who had applied to leave. For those without proper ‘permission’, the factory 
would confiscate their salary and they were prohibited from returning to the factory for 
employment for six months. 
 A special ‘rationalization reform’ was also made to lower the wage costs of the zhi 
yuan by restricting their overtime working hours in March 2007. The maximum 
overtime hours of zhi yuan was set at 72 per month. They would not get extra pay for 
any hours worked beyond that level.  
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The front-line supervisors had to take care of more lines when other supervisors 
were on leave. For technicians, a smaller number was on duty in each shop.    
 The immediate cause of the strike was due to the wage policy of the city 
government. As mentioned, the city had significantly raised the minimum wage rate in 
July 2005 and 2006, and workers generally expected a similar pay rise in July 2007, but 
the government finally decided not to raise the legal minimum rate but maintained it at 
700 yuan. A strike was immediately sparked on the second day after the workers got 
their July pay slip in August. 
 
 
COLLECTIVE ACTION FOR A REASONABLE WAGE AND WORKING CONDITIONS 
 Workers got their pay slips on Thursday 16 August. Workers’ salaries had not been 
raised. Furthermore, technicians and supervisors found their incomes were severely 
reduced due to the overtime restrictions. For example, one of the technicians, whose 
salary was always well over 2,000 yuan, only received 1,400 yuan. On the Friday 
evening, when the managers (who only work during the day) had left the factory, a 
public letter was posted on the notice board of all of the workshops. 
 The letter was issued in the name of all of the factory X workers and entitled 
‘voices from zhi yuan and yuan gong’. It began by pointing out that the management 
had attempted to lower their salary from the end of 2006, and now their income had 
been reduced by 50 percent from the same period last year, while work quotas and 
living costs had doubled. ‘We have reasonable demands’, the letter stated:4  
 
1. To adjust our current wage standard. We all know the market wage standard now, 
and thus demand it should be adjusted to the following ways: yuan gong, 1,500 yuan 
or more; second level zhi yuan, 2,000 yuan or more; third level zhi yuan, 2,500 yuan 
or more; fourth level zhi yuan, 3,000 yuan or more; the above does not include any 
subsidy. 
2. To raise the accommodation and food subsidy for living outside. 
3. To improve welfare conditions, provide reasonable allowances for high temperature, 
toxic, outdoor and occupational disease-prone posts and regular occupational 
disease and body checks. 
4. To provide night shift subsidy and snack allowance for those working on the night 
shift. 
5. The company should buy unemployment, maternity, medical care and all of the 
other insurances requested by the labour law. 
6. To solve the hygiene problem of drinking water. 
7. To improve the reasonability of overtime work. 
8. The trade union should function appropriately and its core members should invite 
the grass roots yuan gong to participate in it. 
 
The letter ended up stating that the workers requested that the company answer 
these demands in written form and that they would not accept an oral reply from 
anybody, including the company CEO. News began to circulate among the workers that 
the technicians would start a strike soon. 
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After more and more workers, mostly young women, joined in, the technicians then 
led the crowd onto a crossroads in the industrial towns. It was not a busy road and not 
many cars came, several policemen just stood by the workers peacefully. ‘One 
policeman even told us that it was useless to stay there and we should go to the major 
national road’, a worker said. Half an hour later, the mass walked out to the national 
highway and occupied one half of the main road. Hundreds of security forces, including 
patrol police, military police, transport police and local government security guards 
came, followed by labour bureau officers, the town Party general-secretary and the 
factory managers. The local party head, labour bureau representative and top manager 
spoke to the strikers with amplifiers and asked them to go back to the factory for 
negotiation. Officers said that it was illegal to stand there and that anything could be 
discussed in the factory while the manager asked the workers to elect their 
representatives. Some of the workers responded that ‘we are all representatives’ or ‘we 
have no representatives’. 
One of the significant features of this strike was that it also happened almost 
simultaneously at the subsidiary factory in a different town. This strike was soon spread 
out to other factories around the industrial town. It had a significant knock-on effect on 
other factories in the same community and in the same business group. In our 
observation, the strike wave from 2003 to 2007 at least partially accounted for the 
dramatic rise of the legal minimum wage rate and the local state’s improved labour law 
inspections. Moreover, it was a breakthrough that organizers in factory X were able to 
coordinate workers in two factories to stage a strike together in order to enhance their 
bargaining power. The strike resulted in a 10 percent increase in the wage of the 
technicians and supervisors and a 5 percent wage increase for production workers. 
This strike demonstrates an important process for us to understand in the formation 
of the new Chinese working class. The alliance between the supervisory staff and the 
production workers in factory X and the knock-on effect from factory X to another 
factory in the industrial district show an increasingly maturity of the working class in 
China which has learned how to take collective actions step by step. In recent years, 
workers in foreign owned enterprises in coastal China more frequently resort to strikes 
to express their grievances and discontents (Chan 2008a, 2008b, C. Chan 2009). We 
argue that recent labour protest are mostly interest-based, purposively induced to 
improve working conditions and oppositional against capital. Without strong leadership 
or formal organizations, most of the labour conflicts are triggered off squarely at the 
point of production, with the reproduction space as the bedrock for labour mobilization. 
Turning to labour disputes referred to legal bodies, these too have been soaring 
since the early 1990s. To restore social stability, the Chinese government has attempted 
to resolve labour disputes through institutional means. In August 1993, the State 
Council promulgated its Regulations on the Handling of Enterprise Labour Disputes. 
Employees of all kinds of enterprises were legally entitled to raise complaints 
concerning wages, benefits, occupational health and safety, and termination of contracts 
to labour dispute arbitration committees at the county, city and provincial levels. The 
number of arbitrated labour disputes was 19,098 in 1994 and it reached an all-time high 
of 317,162 in 2006, involving 679,312 labourers nationwide (see Table 1). Also 
significant has been the rapid rise of arbitrated collective labour disputes, involving 3 or 
 142 
more workers. In 1994, 1,482 cases were recorded. By 2006, the number had increased 
to 13,977. These statistical data indicate a deterioration of labour relations.  
 
Table 1. ational total of arbitrated labour disputes in China, 1994-2006 
Year Arbitrated labour 
disputes (cases) 
Arbitrated collective 
labour disputes 
(cases)* 
Total employees involved 
1994 19,098 1,482 77,794 
1995 33,030 2,588 122,512 
1996 47,951 3,150 189,120 
1997 71,524 4,109 221,115 
1998 93,649 6,767 358,531 
1999 120,191 9,043 473,957 
2000 135,206 8,247 422,617 
2001 154,621 9,847 556,230 
2002 184,116 11,024 608,396 
2003 226,391 10,823 801,042 
2004 260,471 19,241 764,981 
2005 313,773 16,217 744,195 
2006 317,162 13,977 679,312 
Source: China Labour Statistical Yearbook 1995: 491 (Tables 8-11), 1996: 423 (Tables 
8-9), 2004: 518 (Table 4), 2007: 515-16 (Tables 9-1). 
 
* Note: ‘Arbitrated collective labour disputes’ is defined as arbitrated labour disputes involving three or 
more workers, and is a sub-set of the total number of arbitrated labour disputes (Article 5 of Regulations 
on the Handling of Enterprise Labour Disputes of the People’s Republic of China).  
   
 The majority of labour disputes are concerned with the non-payment and/or 
under-payment of basic wages and overtime premiums, illegal termination of labour 
contracts and refusal to pay social insurance and benefits.  
The climate of deteriorating labour relations shows no sign of abating as a result of 
the global economic crisis and the threat of unemployment. In fact, quite the opposite.  
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In the first six months of 2008, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security 
statistics revealed that arbitrated labour disputes soared by 145 percent in Chongqing 
and 92.5 percent in Shanghai (Southern Weekly, 31 July 2008). In the same period, 
courts in Guangdong province received nearly 40,000 new labour dispute cases—a 
157.7 percent increase from 2007, in which the Pearl River Delta area accounted for 
96.5 percent of all cases (China Daily, 22 July 2008). Between January and September 
2008, labour arbitration departments in Beijing handled 32,954 labour disputes, up 104 
percent from the same period in 2007 (Beijing Review, 20 January 2009). 
Furthermore, there is ample evidence that Chinese migrant workers are becoming 
more pro-active in defending their rights. We observe the radicalization of labour in 
which strikes, street actions and public demonstrations are increasingly used (Leung and 
Pun 2009). Indeed, despite institutional barriers to labour self-organization, migrant 
workers have expressed their discontent and demanded changes by staging factory-level 
strikes, bargaining on wages and other terms, launching collective complaints, and/or 
resorting to media exposure for the redress of their problems. 
 
 
5. Channeling Labour Conflicts into State Institutions   
 The increasing number of labour protests and labour conflicts has pressured the 
central government into setting up a new legal regulation framework. Under the 
decentralization policy and the 1993 Regulation on Enterprise Minimum Wages, local 
governments are given the autonomy to formulate their own level for the legal 
minimum wage. More significantly, a national Labour Law was codified and legislated 
in 1994, effective 1 January 1995. The law laid down a foundation for workers’ legal 
rights as well as collective contracts and collective consultations between official trade 
unions and management (Ng and Warner 1999, Taylor, Chang, and Li 200, Clarke, Lee, 
and Li 2004).  
 The huge discrepancy between legal entitlement and the actual delivery of 
protection, however, was so telling that the legitimacy of the Chinese state has been 
undermined. Labour contracts in written form, if provided at all, have been 
predominantly short-term. Workers’ rights are blatantly disregarded. Officials have 
responded by speeding up labour disputes into an expanded system of arbitration 
committees and courts. The goals are to individualize and demobilize worker discontent 
through the bureaucratic and legal procedures, to continue driving economic reforms 
and holding on to the one party regime.  
 In 2007, the state promulgated three new national labour laws, namely, the Labour 
Contract Law, the Labour Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law and the Employment 
Promotion Law.   
 The first of these laws, the Labour Contract Law, which went into effect on 1 
January 2008, is considered the most significant piece of Chinese labour law reform in 
more than a decade (Ngok 2008). Faced with strong corporate opposition at home and 
abroad, or a ‘sweatshop lobby,’ to the proposed legislation on labour contracts (Global 
Labour Strategies 2007), the Chinese government eventually pushed through the law. 
Important provisions include: mandatory labour contracts for new employees for all  
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employment relation; strengthening worker representatives’ and workplace-based trade 
unions’ roles in representing their workers’ interests; worker entitlement to severance 
pay upon the expiration or termination of contracts under certain conditions; the 
regulation of contingent labour; and the imposition of disciplinary measures on officials 
who neglect their responsibilities or abuse their authority. By mid-March 2008, the Vice 
President of the All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) reported to the media 
that up to 80 to 90 percent of employees nationwide had already signed their written 
employment contracts (China ews, 15 March 2008), notwithstanding findings to the 
contrary analyzed by a number of Hong Kong and Chinese nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) based in southern China (J. Chan 2009). The second law on the 
mediation and arbitration of employment disputes was enforced on 1 May 2008, 
International Labour Day. It facilitates access to the arbitration system by waiving 
arbitration fees, amounting to several hundred yuan. It further streamlines the process of 
arbitration and extends the time limit for aggrieved and injured workers to bring their 
claims to arbitration. The third law on equal employment opportunities mandates local 
governments to take measures to eliminate discrimination and to promote equality in all 
forms of employment. Millions of hepatitis B virus (HBV) carriers in China, for 
example, should enjoy their rights to fair recruitment and equal terms at work.  
Last, but not least, the state-run union aims to set up more branches in the 
workplace (at the grassroots level), thereby mediating labour disputes at the first place. 
By March 2008, the ACFTU had a 193-million strong membership—the largest in the 
world—and more than 1.5 million enterprise-based unions nationwide, across the state 
and non-state sectors (China ews, 15 March 2008). Union officials are mandated to 
promote the rule of law and foster a harmonious relationship between employers and 
employees.  
 
 
STATE ABSENCE FROM DEFENDING WORKERS’ RIGHTS IN STRUGGLES 
 Despite the formulation of a better legal framework, in the critical realm of 
workplace collective bargaining and labour strikes, the Chinese state is almost entirely 
absent. Workers’ fundamental right to strike—the clause removed from China’s 1982 
Constitution—remains absent under the twice amended Trade Union Law in 1992 and 
2001. Although the state has actively engaged in workplace relations by labour 
legislation, workers’ basic economic rights especially those of strike, association and 
collective bargaining as benchmarked by the international standard, are all still absent in 
the reforms. The intention to weaken workers’ associational power is very explicit. 
 In reality, official unions are politically constrained in confronting employers, 
leaving workers to fight on their own. In collective bargaining and negotiation, union 
cadres are the only legal labour organization to represent the interests of workers. As 
Cai (2006: 66) precisely puts it: the ACFTU would never ‘assume the role of organizers 
for the workers’ collective action against the management, not to mention against the 
government.’ Without the rights to organize, Chinese workers do not have 
institutionalized associational power to bargain with employers. The existing collective  
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contract system in China, which is supposed to be based on collective negotiation, is 
therefore unable to reflect workers’ collective right in any meaningful sense (Chen 
2007). 
 Worse yet, the unpredictability of the decisions made by arbitrators or judges, if not 
overt unfairness, have brought about very tense labour relations. Under fiscal and 
administrative decentralization policies, local states are driven to retain revenues and 
accumulate resources rather than to implement labour laws and regulations. Intense 
competition among localities to lure foreign investment has resulted in the ‘flexible’ 
enforcement of labour laws. Lower courts continue to depend on funding from local 
governments, and local judges lack autonomy and independence to uphold the law, 
especially in cases where outcomes are contrary to powerful interests. Despite the fact 
that the lower courts are increasingly reaching out to other courts of equal rank for 
guidance in making difficult legal decisions—an impressive development of ‘horizontal 
networking’ between the courts in fostering legal innovations—extensive external 
interference from higher courts and party officials persists (Liebman 2007). Under these 
circumstances, workers’ rights often end at the courtroom door.  
 At times of financial slowdown, Chinese workers’ structural position becomes even 
more precarious: about 8,500 enterprises in Guangdong province alone shut their doors 
in October 2008 (Associated Press, 19 October 2008). China’s manufacturing sector 
contracted for the fifth consecutive month in December 2008, leaving tens of thousands 
of workers from the exported-oriented manufacturing industries jobless. At the critical 
moment, the Dongguan municipal government, fearing a break out of popular protest, 
paid more than 24 million yuan to compensate for the unpaid wages of the 7,000 
protesting workers of two toy factories owned by Smart Union Group (Holdings) 
Limited, a Hong Kong publicly listed company, when the owner secretly fled and the 
production suspended in mid-October 2008 (China Daily, 23 October 2008). However, 
much-needed social security programs, such as unemployment insurance for migrant 
workers, have never been put in place. Indeed, the state is still largely remaining outside 
of the urban reproduction of migrant workers by denying them basic social, economic 
and political rights. 
 Subject to continuing class and social deprivations, disgruntled workers are 
standing up to fight for their interests. China’s judicial departments predict that the 
number of labour disputes is likely to keep rising across provinces, autonomous regions 
and municipalities, amid the downturn in the global economy.  
 
 
6. Conclusion   
 In this paper we have argued that the great transformation of China’s socialist 
economy was largely driven by the state. The launch of Deng Xiaoping’s open polices 
in 1978 was historic and unprecedented. It has changed not only the path of Chinese 
socialism but also the road of global capitalism. The Chinese state has brought the 
country into the WTO, further demonstrating this state-driven process of economic 
globalization. 
 The state-initiated process is, paradoxically, accompanied by a state retreat process 
from the key areas of social reproduction and social protection. Alongside the rise of a  
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new working class in the industrial and urban areas, the state—at various levels—is 
almost missing in providing collective consumption such as housing, education, medical 
care and other basic necessities for migrant workers in particular to live in the towns 
and cities. This has underlain a specific path of proletarianization of Chinese 
peasant-workers which contributes to a sharp rise of migrant worker struggles in China. 
 In summary, this paradoxical role of the state has resulted in the formation of a new 
working class in China which is left unprotected, despite the proactive role of the state 
in promulgating new labour laws and regulations. The absence of the ACFTU in times 
of collective labour disputes and workers’ strikes further weakens the associational 
power of the workers who, due to their peasant-worker identity, already suffer acutely 
from their lack of market bargaining power. Worker radicalism has intensified, as 
workers have learned how to organize collective action on their own. In concrete, lived 
space—in the workers’ dormitories and social communities—Chinese workers are 
developing higher levels of class awareness and identification that make them more 
capable of forming mutual support networks based on shared interests. Their resilience 
is likely to intensify further in the face of the current global economic recession.  
 
 
                                                 
OTES 
1  A Gini coefficient at 0.4 or above is considered very high by international 
comparative standards (the measure used to compare international income inequality in 
which 0 indicates absolute equality and 1 absolute inequality). 
2 In the 2000 China Population Census, internal migrants or floaters are defined as 
those who have resided at their destinations for six months or more. The National 
Bureau of Statistics adopts a broad definition of the floating population that includes 
inter-provincial, intra-provincial and intra-county migrants (the 130 million migrant 
workers are employed in towns and cities; another 70-80 million workers are engaged in 
rural non-farm employment within their home villages or towns at the time of survey). 
3 This discussion draws upon material published in Chris King-Chi Chan and Pun Ngai 
(2009).  
4 Our own translation, September 2007. 
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